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DESIGNATION OF PARTIES
In view of the multiple parties and the roles which
they play in this action, it is not deemed feasible to recognize
the parties as plaintiff, defendant, crossclaimant, etc.
Accordingly, throughout this brief, the parties will be recognized by name.

The plaintiff, Mallory Engineering, Inc., will

be designated throughout this brief as "Mallory"; the defendant,
Ted R. Brown & Associates, Inc., as "Brown"; the defendant, Valad
Electric Heating Corp., as "Valad".
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This action arises out of an order for the manufacture
of certain heaters, to conform to the requirements of Mallory,
and guaranteed and certified by the manufacturer, Valad, to meet
these requirements; which in fact, upon delivery, did not meet
these requirements, giving rise to a claim for damages by Mallory,
which Mallory asserts against both Brown and Valad, Brown having
placed the order for the heaters with Valad.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Trial to the Court sitting without a jury took place
January 19, 1976, to and including January 29, 1976.

The Court

awarded judgment in favor of the plaintiff Mallory against
defendants Brown, and against the defendant Valad; and awarded
judgment in favor of the defendant Brown against the defendant
Valad for the full amount of judgment awarded by the Court to
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Mallory against Brown, together with the amount of loss
suffered by Brown by reason of Valad's failure to manufacture
and deliver the heaters to Mallory as required.

The Court denie:

the counterclaim and crossclaim of Valad and the same was dismissed upon its merits.

(R. 696)

The judgment reserved issues

on the counterclaim and amended counterclaim between Brown and
Mallory for future trial by the Court.

(R. 678, 679)

Upon motion to the Court, the Court amended the judgrnen:
and added to the judgment a provision limiting the total liabilit:
of Valad under the judgment awarded to Mallory and the judgment
awarded to Brown, to the amount of the loss suffered by Mallory
plus the loss suffered by Brown.

(R. 695, 696)

The parties

filed with the Court objections to the findings of fact, conclus:::J
of law, and the proposed judgment, portions of which resulted in
some amendments to the judgment.
in the judgment as entered.

These amendments were incorpord

The Court, however, elected to

consi:~

the objections to the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
judgment as a motion for new trial.

It made and entered its

order denying the motion for new trial.

(R. 680, 681)

The appeals basically are taken from the judgment as
amended (R. 695, 696), and the order of the Court denying the
motion for new trial.

(R. 680, 681)

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Brown seeks reversal of the judgment granted by the le•'~
Court to Mallory against Brown, and affirrnance of the judgment
awarded to Brown against Valad for the loss suffered by Brown
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as a result of Valad's failure of performance.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The theatrical and argumentatively characterized
statement of facts contained in Valad's brief fails to accurately
set forth the fundamental and factual details essential for
consideration by this Court.

Accordingly, Brown elects to make

its own statement of facts.
Mallory had a contract with the United States Government
to build certain environmental test chambers.

(T. 4, Ex. 1, 2, 3)

It was in need of electric heaters to perform certain functions
in connection with the government contract.

(T. 10)

Roy Mallory,

president of Mallory, asked Brown, through its representative
Nyman, if it had a source from which such heaters could be
obtained.

(T. 311)

Carl Nyman, a sales representative of Brown,

made inquiry and located literature and catalog data indicating
Valad Electric Heating Corp. as a possible fabricator, and submitted this sales and catalog data and information on the company
to Mr. Roy Mallory, President of Mallory.
(Ex. 42, 43, 44, 45)

(T. 99, 311, 312)

Mr. Nyman made clear to Mallory that it

had not had previous experience with Valad as a manufacturer.
(T. 100, 311)

It appeared that Valad had the potential to

make the heaters.

(T. 97, 98, 311, 312)

Mr. Roy Mallory, President

of Mallory, advised Mr. Nyman that he might be able to use heaters
manufactured by Valad and that he would consider them.

(T. 312)

Some two months after the original presentation to Roy Mallory,
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Mallory contacted Brown through

~yman

and asked Brown to obtain

a quotation on some heaters to be utilized in these government
test chambers.

(T. 313)

Mr. Mallory furnished to Nyman of Brown

the electrical kilowatt capacity required of the heater, the
voltage required, the size capabilities and limitations, and the
airflow, as well as the sheath temperature requirements.

(T. 313)

Nyman of Brown submitted this information by telephone to Valad
through Peter Cecchini, its office manager.

(T. 314, 315)

The

quotations on the original criteria did not give rise to orders.
(T. 318-321)

Subsequently, Mallory supplied to Brown new specific

performance criteria on the size, type and limitations of the
heaters and asked for a new quotation.

(T. 321-323)

Nyman of

Bw~

submitted this information by telephone to Valad in December of
1972; and Peter Cecchini, speaking for Valad, affirmed that Valad
could make the heaters and furnished to Nyman by telephone the
dimensional and electrical data, as well as a price quote which
was furnished by Nyman to Mallory.

(T. 584)

The quote was

accepted by Mallory and a purchase order issued for the first
of a

seri~s

of heaters.

This order was number 4016.

(Ex. 9)

Brown issued its purchase order transmitting the Mallory purchase
order, Brown's purchase order being number 6730.

(Ex. 10)

The

purchase order issued by Mallory to Brown and transmitted by
Brown to Valad contained this language:
"Fabricator shall also submit written certification that sheath temperature will not exceed
plus 250° F. when operating at continuous full
voltage with a 5 F.P.S. air volocity and the
maximum air temperature of plus 160° F." (Ex. 9)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Certain drawings were submitted by Valad to Mallory
direct.

(Ex. 17, 18)

(T. 106)

After review of the drawings

by Mr. Farber of Mallory with Mr. Nyman of Brown, clearance
was given for manufacture. (Ex. 11, 20)

(T. 139)

The shop

drawings submitted did not give the details necessary for Nyman
or Mallory to evaluate the heater performance characteristics,
but was limited solely to dimension and configuration. (T. 279)
The heaters were not delivered in accordance with the
schedule set forth on the purchase orders and by subsequent
correspondence.

Mallory dealt

directly with Valad in connection

with the matter of delay in delivery. (T. 345, 346)

When the

15- and 21-watt kilowatt heaters were received, they did not
conform to the requirements of the purchase order and the
certification and guarantee which had been issued directly by
Valad to Mallory. (T. 36, 75, 86, 105)

(Ex. 22, 23)

When received and tested, the heaters did not perform
and were found to be deficient in capacity and have excessive
sheath temperatures. (T. 127, 128)

Mallory was required to

obtain substitute heaters from other sources as Valad refused
to take any steps to correct the situation. (T. 75)

Regan

Engineering made replacement heaters. (R. 91)
The foregoing is a statement of the essential facts
involved in this action.
simple.

The factual situation is relatively

The complexities arise from the effort of Valad to

shift to either Brown or Mallory the responsibility for its
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incompetence and failure to manufacture in accordance with
requirements.

Additional facts will be set forth in the argument

as may be requisite to the presentation thereof.
ARGUMENT
Point I
THE UTAH COURT DOES HAVE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER THE
DEFENDANT VALAD: A. UNDER THE "LONG-ARM STATUTE", UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED (1953), SEC. 78-27-22, ET SEQ., AND PARTICULARLY
SEC. 78-27-24(2) (3). B. THE DEFENDANT APPEARED AND SUBMITTED
ITSELF TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT.
In support of part "A" of this point, we submit Utah
Code Annotated (1953)

(as amended), Sec. 78-27-22, carries a

statement of the legislative policy established by the legislatur:
in enacting the "Long-Arm Statute".

It specifically sets forth

the fact that the "Long-Arm Statute" should be applied to assert
jurisdiction over non-resident defendants to the fullest extent
permitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution.
"It is declared, as a matter of legislative
determination, that the public interest demands
the state provide its citizens with an effective
means of redress against nonresident persons,
who through certain significant minimal contacts
with this state, incur obligations to citizens
entitled to the state's protection. This
legislative action is deemed necessary because
of technological progress which has substantially
increased the flow of commerce between the
several states, resulting in increased interaction
between persons of this state and persons of other
states.
The provisions of this act, to ensure maximum
protection to citizens of this state, should
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be applied so as to assert jurisdiction
over non-resident defendant to the fullest
extent permitted by the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution."
The Code sets forth in Sec. 24 certain specific conduct
or acts which may give rise to a claim by a Utah resident against
a non-resident wherein a non-resident will be subjected to the
jurisdiction of the Utah Court.
"Any person, notwithstanding Sec. 16-10-102,
whether or not a citizen or resident of this
state, who in person or through an agent does
any of the following enumerated acts, submits
himself, and if an individual, his personal
representative, to the jurisdiction of the
courts of this state as to any claim arising
from:
(1) The transaction of any business
within this state;
(2) Contracting to supply services or
goods in this state;
(3) The causing of any injury within
this state whether tortious or by breach of
warranty; • • . "
(Emphasis ours) 78-27-24 UCA (1953) (as amended)
There is no dispute that Valad Electric Heating Corp.
contracted to supply heaters in the State of Utah.

Since the

heaters did not function properly, and in an effort to avoid
the responsibility for this failure, much effort has been expended
by Valad in analyzing the relationship between the respective
parties, Mallory Engineering, Inc., and Ted R. Brown & Associates,
Inc., as to whether the contract ran from Valad to Brown or
from Valad to Mallory; but there has not been any denial at
any time that there was indeed a contract and that heaters were
manufactured and were shipped by Valad directly to Mallory in

- 8 -
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the State of Utah for use in Mallory's business in this state
in producing an envirorunental test chamber.

In addition,

defendant Valad issued a direct certificate of guarantee or
warranty of performance to Mallory Engineering, Inc.

This

certification was required as a condition to the contract.
(R. 104, 105)

(Ex. 22, 23)

In the recent case of Abbott GM Diesel, Inc. vs. Piper
Aircraft decided April 14, 1978, 578 P.2d 850, this Court has
clearly established that where a party does one of the acts
establishing jurisdiction under the "Long-Arm Statute", it
subjects itself to the jurisdiction of the State of Utah.

Valad

contracted to supply heaters built by it for a specific function
and which it warranted would meet the requirements of the Utah
consumer, namely Mallory Engineering, Inc.

The action of Valad

was voluntary in contracting to supply the heaters in Utah.
It desired the business, it must therefore accept the responsibility entailed, and the jurisdiction over Valad is established
by the act cited.

We respectfully submit that the Utah case

above cited is dispositive of the arguments advanced by the
defendant Valad wherein it seeks to avoid the jurisdiction of
the Utah Court under the "Long-Arm Statute".
Secondly, in support of part "B" of this point, there
can be no question but that Valad waived any jurisdictional
question and entered a general appearance in this action.

The

attempt by counsel in the brief submitted on this issue to lump
all of the actions of Valad in the District Court under one

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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,

blanket

car~'1ot

be successful.

Counsel clai.-r.s in its brief that

Valad did not enter a general appearance, basing its claim on
the specious argument that the documents filed with the District
Court consisted solely of one document, and that this document
raised at the first opportunity the jurisdictional
question with or without special appearance.

An examination

of the document clearly shows that this is not the fact.
refer the Court to the record, pages 23 thro.ugh 34.

We

While

counsel for Valad elected to bind in a single blue cover two
separate documents, this does not make these documents one
document or act before the Court.
items.

They are distinct and separate

The first document accessible upon examination is an

answer, counterclaim and cross-complaint to the pleading of
Ted R. Brown & Associates, Inc.
answer to Mallory's complaint.

The second document is an
It is true that in the so-called

"answer" the defense of jurisdiction over the defendant Valad
is raised; but even in that document, it is not, as has been
traditionally required, raised as the initial defense before
responding to the remainder of the pleading.

Instead, the

answer responds directly by specific answer and denial or
admission to the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint.
(R. 24)

It then seeks to raise the jurisdictional question.
While we recognize that the Court has liberalized

greatly the rules relating to "special appearance", and has
under the Utah rule permitted the jurisdictional matter to be
raised other than by special pleading and as a part of the

- 10 -
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i t has,

presentation of

t.~is

~evertbe:ess,

i~sis~ed

upon the

cefense in a manner which alerts both

the Court and parties to the claimed defect in jurisdiction.
Rather than raise and stand upon the defense of lack of jurisdiction in any manner, the defendant has submitted to the
jurisdiction and answered to a cross-complaint.
in this action was filed September 20, 1973.

The complaint

(R. 2)

The answer,

counterclaim and cross-complaint of Brown was not filed until
October 15, 1973.

The complaint and summons were served by the

Sheriff in New York upon the defendant Valad.

(R. 442)

The

pleading by Brown was served by Certified Mail, Return Receipt
Requested, upon Valad Electric Heating Corp., at 71 Courtland
Street, Terry Town, New York, 10591.

(R. 19)

No confusion could

exist as to the fact that these were two separate documents,
two separate pleadings filed by two separate parties, and called
for distinct and separate responses.

The requirement of response

to Brown's pleading was conditioned upon the jurisdiction of
the Court established through the service of the summons and
the complaint; for the method elected by Brown to serve the
cross-complaint was pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure
of Utah.

If the defendant Valad asserted and intended to rely

upon the assertion of lack of jurisdiction, no necessity arose
for response to the pleading of Brown.

By recognizing the

validity of this pleading and responding thereto without
raising any jurisdictional question in such responsive pleading,
and by asserting therein an affirmative defense; and setting

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 11 -

forth by title a crossclaim and coW1terclaim and seeking
general relief thereon, the defendant clearly waived the issue
of jurisdiction and appeared in the Utah Court.

The fact that

the two separate documents were enclosed in one blue-cover
binding cannot be said to make them one pleading.

The pleading

to Brown's cross-complaint waived the jurisdictional defense.
It should be further noted that from the inception of
the case until the case was ready to be set for trial, no further
objection to jurisdiction of the Court was made by Valad.

Valad

consistently subjected itself to the jurisdiction of the Utah
Court by responding to interrogatories, requests for admission,
and other pleadings.

The sole basis for responding to these

pleadings is the requirement of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Counsel in his brief claims that the response to discovery and
the filing of other pleadings does not subject Valad to the
personal jurisdiction of the Court.

Yet, in the same brief at

page 13, he states:
"All of these discovery responses were
filed pursuant to the mandatory rules
requiring responses to lawful discovery
requests."
Response under the Rules can only be enforced where
the Court has jurisdiction over the defendant.

Failing juris-

diction, no duty to respond exists.
Some effort is made in Valad's brief to assert that
by reason of the fact that the corporation was appearing pro se,
that no appearance could be established.

This argument is
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tenuous at best, but clearly disposed of by the fact that
the further blue-backed responses made by Valad carried the
name of counsel.

We respectfully call the Court's attention

to p. 74 of the record, and p. 107 of the record, both of which
are on a printed form of Godfrey P. Schmidt, Attorney at Law,
and both of which carry the statement that he is the attorney
for Valad.

Likewise, they carry the identification of the

contents just above the name of the attorney.

It has been

repeatedly held that a corporation which appears improperly
through an agent other than its attorney may not avoid the
results of a proceeding by alleging the impropriety of its own
appearance.

19 ALR 3d, 1073 at 1087.

In the annotation above

cited, the annotating authority states:
"The filing of an appearance through the
president of the defendant corporation,
who was an attorney, was termed an 'obvious
impropriety' in American Sand & Gravel,
Inc. vs. Clark & Fray Construction Company,
2 Conn. Cir. 284, 198(a) 2d 68; but the
Court, in rendering a judgment for the
plaintiff for an amount due on a purchase
by the defendant, stated that the defendant
had been afforded an opportunity to have
its case fully and thoroughly heard."
Officers of the corporation were held to have entered
a voluntary appearance even though not represented by attorneys
in other cases cited in the annotation.

Under the circumstances

here, the fact that the attorney did not sign the pleading which
he enclosed in his printed cover bearing his name and filed
with the Court, should offer no protection to the corporate
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

defendant.

The District Court ruled that Valad had appeared

and that it must obtain local counsel or it would be considered
in default.

(R. 128, 129)

Valad recognized the order and

did promptly appear through counsel.

(R. 135, 136)

entered purported to be a special appearance.

The appearance

It is submitted

that this was manifestly untimely, and the effort to raise the
question of jurisdiction by pleadings, which the Court interpreted as a motion to quash service of summons, was promptly
dealt with by the District Court, after due hearing by an order
of the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., Judge, denying the
motion to quash service of summons.

This order was made and

entered the 28th day of April, 1975.

(R. 170)

An appeal from

the order was taken but dismissed by the Supreme Court, which
by its remittitur simply provided that:
"Issue of jurisdiction may be reserved as
issue on ultimate appeal, if taken."
We respectfully submit to this Court that for the
reasons set forth herein, the jurisdiction of the Utah Court
over Valad is firmly established.

Point II
TED R. BROWN & ASSOCIATES, INC., SERVED ONLY IN THE CAPACITY OF
INTERMEDIARY IN PLACING MALLORY'S ORDER FOR HEATERS WITH VALAD
FOR MANUFACTURE AND SHOULD NOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE INCOMPETENCE
OF VALAD WHICH RESULTED IN DEFECTIVE MANUFACTURE OF THE HEATERS.
Had Valad syntactically diagramed the sentence structure
of the purchase orders of Mallory and Brown and applied the law
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cited by counsel relating to the formation of contracts as
diligently as has counsel in trying to relieve Valad from the
consequences of its own incompetence, this case would not now
be before the Court.

See the syntactical diagram.

(R. 572)

There is a maxim of law frequently applied by the Court that
the Court will look to the substance, not form, in evaluating
a relationship between parties to litigation.

Illustrative

of this principal is the situation wherein the parties intending
to create security for a loan will use a Warranty Deed in place
of a mortgage.

The Courts have repeatedly held that while

on its face and by its form the transaction appears to be an
outright conveyance, the true relationship of the parties will
be determined from the intent and action

of the parties; and

the Warranty Deed is treated as a mortgage.
There is abundant Utah case law supporting the
principal that the meaning and affect to be given a contract
depend upon the intent of the parties, and that is to be ascertained by looking at the entire contract and all of its parts
in their relationship to each other.

See Thomas J. Peck & Sons

vs. Lee Rock Products, Inc., 30 Utah 2d 187, 515 P.2d 446.
In the case of Harding, Inc. vs. Eimco Corporation,
266 p.2d 494, the Court recognized that in interpretation of
a contract the interpretation given by the parties themselves,
as shown by their acts, will be adopted by the Court.

Use

of the conduct of the parties themselves as a basis for determination of a contractual relationship is recognized statutortl~
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in the Uniform Commercial Code.

70(A)-2-207(3), UCA (1953)

(as amended), relating to the subject of sales, states:
"Conduct by both parties which recognizes
the existence of a contract, is sufficient
to establish a contract for sale, although
the writings of the parties do not otherwise
establish a contract.
In such case, the
terms of the particular contract consist of
those terms on which the writings of the
parties agree, together with any supplementary terms incorporated under any other
provisions of this act."
Brown does not dispute the contention of Mallory that
the heaters supplied by Valad were defective and were not
manufactured in accordance with the mandate of the purchase
order of Mallory as transmitted by Brown to Valad; and that the
heaters did not conform to the warranty or certification issued
by Valad directly to Mallory.

The contention between Brown

and Mallory is Mallory's effort to make Brown responsible for
the default of Valad.

We submit that a reasonable interpretation

of the documents and the actions of the parties will not support
Mallory's claim against Brown; and the lower Court erred when
it granted Mallory judgment against Brown, and also against Valad.
From the beginning, Mallory knew that Brown was simply attempting
to locate a source of supply to provide heaters to Mallory with
the dual hope that by so doing they would accommodate an established
customer, and secondly, earn a small commission or fee for their
efforts.
Lee Farber, president and general manager of Mallory,
testified with regard to Brown as follows:
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"Question: Now, in making that requirement
that you set up through your exhibit through Exhibit no. 4, your criteria, you
knew that Ted R. Brown & Associates could
not, from their own facilities, provide
that equipment, didn't you?
Answer: Yes.
Question: And so you knew that they were
going to get these from Valad Manufacturing
Company, the agency that is represented
by those documents Exhibits 42-4S(b)?
Answer:
It was indicated that if we gave
Ted R. Brown the purchase order for the
heaters, that Valad would be the manufacturer
of those heaters." (T. 102, lines 10-20)
Again, this same witness, at transcript 104, line 2,
answered the question as follows:
"Question: You required in that purchase
order that the performance of these heaters
be certified not by Brown, but by the
manufacturer, did you not?
Answer: Yes.
Question: So that you were not looking to
Brown to certify or to pass upon the quality
or the performance of this heater? You were
expecting the manufacturer to warrant to
you the performance characteristics of this
heater?
Answer: This purchase order 4016 is strictly
a performance purchase order. There is no
design data in here upon which I can build
a heater. The heater manufacturer has to
look at the performance criteria, and from
this criteria, based upon his specific way
of doing business, he has to design. He has
to make the proper application. And our
purchase order says we are looking, as part
of our contract with Brown, that whoever
builds that heater, will certify that it
will be constructed to meet the requirements,
the performance requirements that we stipulated.
Question: And in this case, that would be
directed to Valad?
Answer:
If Valad was manufacturer, that was
where the certification should be issued from.
Question: And you knew that's where the
manufacture was going to be?

- 17 -
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Answer:
Yes.
It was indicated. We
didn't have any contract to enforce that
upon Brown, however." (T. 104, lines 2-26)
Mr. Nyman of Ted R. Brown explained the procedure at
Ted R. Brown & Associates in handling of an order such as the
order placed by Mallory with Brown for heaters.

In response

to the question asked as to what was done with the order received
from Mallory, Mr. Nyman testified:
"After receiving the particular purchase
order from Mallory, we did, as we normally
do, and always do, type up our covering
purchase order, send on to Valad our order
referring to the requirements of Mallory's
order for these particular heaters.
Question: Now do you type up a purchase
order of your own? Excuse me. Why do
you type up a purchase order of Ted R.
Brown & Associates?
Answer: We do this with all of our orders.
It allows us a basic numerical bookkeeping
system by which we can keep track of all
orders, and we do set up this as a standard
procedure, and all orders that come through
Ted R. Brown & Associates from a buyer
to a manufacturer are set up on one of
our purchase orders." (T. 323, lines 13-27)
Thus, while the form pf the transaction characterized
by the issuance of purchase orders by Brown to Valad for the
heaters to be supplied Mallory would seem to indicate a purchase
by Brown and a resale to Mallory, the actual treatment of this
transaction by the parties reflected that all concerned knew
that, in fact, Brown was not purchasing the heaters and reselling
them, but was simply serving as an intermediary, having referred
the purchase order of Mallory to Valad for manufacture and
sale.

The purchase orders themselves required that the product
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be shipped directly to Mallory.

(Ex. 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15)

The method of obtaining approval as to manufacturing details
resulted in Valad submitting the drawings directly to Mallory,
not to Brown.

(T. 32)

When problems developed, either in

connection with the delivery data, or in connection with the
ultimate function of the heaters after shipment, the contacts
were between Mallory and Valad.

(T. 45)

Even after Valad failed

to make correction, Mallory made demand on Valad for performance
and did not give to Brown a copy or a demand of any nature.
(T. 80-84 inc.)

Peter Cecchini, the general manager for Valad,

in his testimony, when asked why he had dealt directly with
Mallory rather than with his claimed purchaser, Brown, stated:
"Question: And in all of the calls that you
made, and sometimes Mr. Mccarron was on the
line, too?
Answer:
That is correct.
Question: You made those to Mr. Farber?
Why weren't you making them to your
customer, Mr. Brown?
Answer: Because the trouble was at Mallory
Engineering, and Mr. Farber had the trouble."
(T. 472)
It is interesting to note that none of the heaters
which were actually manufactured by Valad for Mallory were
made correctly.

Even the heaters which were replaced and even-

tually used, the 12-kilowatt heaters were originally made wrong
and came out to Mallory as only 2-kilowatt heaters, rather than
12-kilowatt heaters.

(T. 456)

A review of the testimony of

Peter Cecchini discloses the total incompetence of this man.
Throughout, if the questioning began to appear to Mr. Cecchini

- 19 -
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to indicate that there was some responsibility at Valad for
the unsatisfactory results, he became evasive and hid behind
the shield that he had no technical knowledge of electricity.
(T. 459, lines 12-14)

While having answered interrogatories

to the effect that he had a degree in industrial engineering,
(R. 87, Int. No. 16) when questioned on the stand, he claimed
that his only area of expertise lay in the business field; and
that the industrial engineering degree which he possessed did
not make him qualified in any sense in the field of electrical
engineering, but only indicated that he had a knowledge of
plant layouts and things of that nature.

(T. 499,500)

Throughout

his testimony, Mr. Cecchini was evasive; and in one instance
it became manifest that while he attempted to place the blame
on Ted R. Brown & Associates for the errors made in manufacture
claiming that the information furnished by Brown was inaccurate,
he finally had to admit that the error, at least in connection
with the 12-kilowatt heater, were errors in his own plant.
(T. 456)

The effort expended by Valad to evade responsibility

for its own incompetence is unbelievable.

Pages and pages of

the transcript of record in this case deal with such items as
the general custom of Valad in regard to its manufacturing
process being broken down into three categories, namely A,

c.

B, and

The first class, according to Mr. Cecchini, was

stock items which they made and held in stock to fill customer's
orders.

The second item was a modified version of the first

class wherein the customer approaches Valad with something of
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his own invention, supplies all the design and manufacture
parameters, and the company then manufactures the heaters from
these design parameters.

The class C, or third type, is where

the customer comes and states that he wants an end result, and
pays a special fee for design by Valad.

In such cases, Valad

always makes a prototype, according to Mr. Cecchini; and if
this is satisfactory and the tests prove the heater satisfactory,
then the production is commenced, but the customer pays for
all costs in such case.

(T. 425, 426)

Almost in the same breath, Mr. Cecchini admitted that
the error in the manufacture of the 12-kilowatt heaters resulted
from the company's not following the instructions received for
the heater's manufacture as a part of the purchase order of
Mallory wh.ich required the 12-kilowatt output.

And while

having testified at length that the production department never
proceeded with the manufacture of an item until it had received
an approved drawing, when confronted with the approved drawing
which red-lined or showed clearly that the company's attention
had been drawn by Mallory to the error, and that the heater
should be a 12-kilowatt heater instead of a 2-kilowatt heater,
Mr. Cecchini was unable to offer any explanation for this mistake.

(T. 456)
Initially, Mr. Cecchini, when taken on direct examinac:·
by his own counsel, attempted to testify with regard to telephone
conversations with Mr. Nyman of Brown, claiming that he had
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notes of the telephone conversations.
incapable of so testifying.

He proved totally

(T. 359-368 inc.)

As is so

frequently the case, he was saved by Court recess. (T. 368);
and upon return to the stand, he had been adequateiy informed
by counsel as to what he should be testifying to.

Unfortunately,

however, even with the help of the recess to rearrange his
testimony, Mr. Cecchini was unable to keep things straight.
To review the testimony of Mr. Cecchini is to become
thoroughly aware of the total incompetence of this man.

He

did not know anything about electrical heaters, and yet he
proudly claimed that he was the one that made the interpretations
and made the sketches that set the thing up for manufacture;
and yet when questioned as to any technical aspects of the
matter in question, he retreated behind his own lack of ability
and claimed that he was not capable in the area of electrical
engineering.

(T. 454-467)

The principal defect which was the reason that the
heaters had to be rejected by Mallory was that the 15-kilowatt
heaters and the 21-kilowatt heaters which, by the terms of
the purchase order from Mallory as forwarded by Brown, were
required to meet this requirement did not do so:
"Fabricator to specify required depth. Heater
to be designed for a maximum sheath temperature
of plus 250° F. when operating at continuous
full voltage with a 5 F.P.S. air velocity,
and a maximum air temperature of plus 160° F."
(Ex.

4)
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Similar requirements were made for the 21KW heater
to that of the 15 KWheater, the air temperature, however, being
slightly higher.

The heaters furnished by Valad did not meet

this requirement.

(T. 39) Much time was expended in trial in

the effort by Valad to show that the heaters as manufactured
by them relied upon thermostats which turned the power on and off
in order to control Sheath temperature.

According to Valad,

this was a satisfactory means of compliance with the language
quoted.

Valad tried to show that by virtue of approval of

certain drawings by Mallory the use of thermostats for this
purpose had been approved.
and Brown.

This was denied by both Mallory

It was shown that the drawings did not give the

detail which would permit the party to whom the drawings were
submitted for approval to evaluate the heaters from a performance
standpoint.
The only expert who was totally independent and had
the requisite engineering qualifications, Mr. Thomas, a graduate
Professional Electrical Engineer produced by Mallory as a witness,
set at rest the effort by valad to justify the use of thermostats
to interrupt the flow of current as a means of control of sheath
temperature as being compliant with the express terms of Mallory's
purchase order.
in other words, I would assume that
this thermostat is being used to control the
heater down to the swing between 250 and 200
degrees.
Q. Is this a proper use of a thermostat, Mr. Thomas?
A. It could be a proper use.
In this case, with the
specifications as I read them, it calls for 15 KW at
continuous full voltage.
Q. So, when you were reading it in connection with
these specifications in this purchase order which
says continuous full voltage, would that be in
compliance with this purchase order?
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of these specifications are that I am to have
the use of a lSKW heaters all the ti.me, and
they will maintain a sheath temperature of 250
degrees.
I don't see here where the 15 KW should
be cut off to comply with the 250 degrees. " (T.599-600)
Again, in further examination Mr. Thomas specifically
states that, in his opinion, any other interpretation of the
purchase orders than

to require the maintenance of the temper-

atures at continuous full voltage, would be in error.

(T. 611 L 5-18)

Ultimately in the testimony of Mr. Mccarron, the
factory superintendent for Valad, upon interrogation by Judge
Taylor, he admitted that Valad could have manufactured a heater
in accordance with the specifications.

It simply did not.

(T.561)

It is thus established that the cause of the problem
is that Valad misinterpreted the requirements submitted to it.
Merely because Brown used the device of issuing its own purchase
order to Valad for the heaters in order to enable it to obtain
a price differential by way of a cornrnission, since it was not
a sales representative of

Vala~

should not make Brown the

0uarantor of performance by Valad.

Despite the effort expended

it was never shown that Brown ever did anything actually wrong
which caused the problem, or was responsible for the deficiency
in performance by Valad.
Even looking upon Brown as Valad insists be done, as
the Vendee of Valad as Vendor, there is substantial authority
to the effect that performance may be excused under the Uniform
Commercial Code as enacted in Utah. In discussing this subject,
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"The Uniform Commercial Code does not catalog
the various contingencies that might excuse
delay or non-delivery, with the exception of
referring to that arising from governmental
regulations.
However, it follo"5pre-code
concepts by excusing a seller from the timely
delivery of goods contracted for where his
performance has become commercially impracticable because of unforseen supervening circumstances not within the contemplation of the
parties at the time of the contracting.
In
addition, circumstances that might excuse performance include a marked increase in costs
because of unforseen circumstances, and an
unanticipated failure of the source of supply,
where the contract contemplates the use of only
a particular source, such as the failure of a
crop under a contract to sell the crop growing
on a designated land . . . . " (emphasis ours)
There is no dispute that all of the parties contemplated
that the manufacturer was to be
heaters.

Valad.

It was the source of the

Its failure to manufacture in accordance with the

requirements and its commitments certainly excuse the failure
to perform by Brown, who was nothing more than an intermediary
in transmit ting the order to the manufacturer.

The same authority

at Sec. 365, Pg. 516, states:
"It has been held that where a seller undertakes to sell particular good~ which he is
obtaining under a specified contract from a
third person, the unjustified refusal of such
third person to make such goods available to
the seller, excuses the seller from his own
contract."
valad' s refusal to make proper heaters to conform to
the order placed with it by Brown is proved in the record.

No

justification was ever proved by Valad for its failure. It simpl!'
relied on its contention that it manufactured what the specifications called for.

The refusal to recognize its own error and

make the corrections called for on the 15KW and the 21 KW heate'.
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and to manufacture the 36KW and the SOKW heaters as ordered
is clearly an unjustified refusal to perform its contract and
it should excuse Brown under the law cited.

POINT III
THE LAW RECOGNIZES THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY CONTRACTS
AND SANCTIONS DIRECT DEALING BETWEEN THE PARTIES
WITHOUT INVOLVEMENT OF THE INTERMEDIARY.
In support of a motion by Brown to dismiss the
Plaintiff

Mallory's complaint as to Brown, Brown presented an

argument and authorities to the Court supporting Brown's
contention that Brown should not be involved in the controversy
which basically involves only Mallory and Valad.

At the

conclusion of the argument the Court indicated that its
persuasion then was,
"I suppose the purpose, really,, and I am
sufficiently in doubt as to Mr. Tibbals'
client, Brown's position, that I think
probably the burden of persuasion would
be on the Plaintiff to persuade me that they
were something more than an intermediary, and
probably simultaneously the briefs can be
prepared on that issue . . . • • " (T. 632)
No justification appears in the record for the
Court to have changed its position and award judgment to
Mallory against Brown, nor does such justification exist in
fact. As shown in the argument under Point II of this brief
the parties throughout have treated Brown as a mediator or
intermediary.

Webster defines and Intermediary as follows:

"One who or that which is intermediate; hence
a mediator; an interagent; a go-between. "
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In a case arising in the State of Washington the
Court was confronted with an almost factually paralell situatior..
In the case of KADIAK FISHERIES COMPANY vs. MURPHY DIESEL
COMPANY, 422 P2d 496; 70 Wash. 2d 153; the case involved a
fishing vessel owned by Kadiak.

It needed a new motor.

The

President of Kadiak discussed the matter with Alaska Pacific
Supply Company, the western Washington sales agent for the
Murphy Diesel Company.

The discussion resulted in Kadiak's

desires and needs being communicated to Murphy Diesel through
Alaska Pacific as well as through a regional sales representative
of Murphy and an acceptance of an order by Murphy for a 325
horsepower, dry manifold, marine diesel motor, expecially
constructed to fit the bed of the Kadiak vessel, the Jaguar.
The motor proved unsatisfactory and Kadiak sued both the Alaska
and the Murphy Diesel companies.

The Court states,

"Throughout the trial it was Kadiak's theory
that privity of contract was established and
existed because (a) Alaska Pacific was an
agent of Murphy Diesel, or (b) Alaska Pacific
was the agent of Kadiak in the transaction, or
(c) Kadiak was the third party beneficiary of a
sales contract between Alaska Pacific and Murphy
Diesel. Murphy Diesel denied privity, asserting
that the relationship between it and Alaska Pacific
was that of vendor and vendee, with Kadiak the
remote purchaser from Alaska Pacific. " P2d Pg 503
The trial court permitted the case to go to the jury
on the issue of Murphy Diesel's responsibility for the damage
and refused further instructions to insulate it from the plainti::·i
claim based on the Murphy Diesel contention that its vendee was
Alaska Pacific.

The Supreme Court found no error in the action

of the trial court and said:
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"\'le find no prejudicial error flowing to Murphy
Diesel from the action of the trial court. We
reach this conclusion because, accepting Murphy
Diesel's thesis that its relationship with Alaska
Pacific was that of vendor and vendee, we are convinced from our view of the statement of facts that
the evidence conclusively established Kadiak as the
third party beneficiary of the sale of the motor in
question by Murphy Diesel. Jeffery v. Hanson
39 Wash 2d 855, 239 P2d 346 (1952)
"Murphy Diesel knew the identity, the purpose, and
requirements of Alaska Pacific's customer -- Kadiak.
It engineered and constructed the motor to meet
certain specifications, e. g. the bed of the Jaguar,
furnished to it not only by Alaska Pacific but by one
of its own regional sales representatives. Although
it invoiced the motor through Alaska Pacific, it
shipped the motor direct to Kadiak. Some communications
were carried on directly between Kadiak and the factory
before and after shipment. An official of the company
the regional sales representative, and a factory
service man visited the Jaguar on various occasions
before and during installation of the motor, and the
service man participated in adjustments and corrections
for the final trial run. After the fire and after
further mechanical troubles developed Murphy Diesel
furnished new parts and dispatched factory service
men to correct the situation, at the behest of Alaska
Pacific as well as Kadiak.
Under these circumstances
it is beyond dispute that Alaska Pacific's purchase
of the motor from Murphy Diesel was upon the consideration that a merchantable motor, fit and suitable
for the marine purposes of Kadiak, would be supplied.
Kadiak thus became the beneficiary of the contract
with Alaska Pacific as the conduit through which the
duty of ordinary care and the implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness flowed. * * "
The case of Freeman v. Navarre, another Washington case
289 P2d 1015 is likewise in point and supports the same theory
under a somewhat different factual situation, but recognized that
one serving as a conduit is not liable for the mal-performance or
non-performance of the third party contractor. We submit that
the Court should have recognized the principals enunciated in
these cases and dismissed Brown from the law suit and granted
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In the brief of Valad, Pcint VII discusses the award
of damages granted by the Court.
there presented.

Brown concurs in the argument

The C curt did not adhere to the correct measure

of damages applicable to this case.
duction by Mallory

The Court allowed the intro-

of a purported statement of overhead embodyir,;

items which could not, under any reasonable cpplication of the
law of damages be related to any loss suffered by Mallory for
which it is entitled to redress against either Valad or Brown.
(Ex 9 9, 101, l 0 2)

The 12 KW heaters were reconstructed by Valad and
accepted by Mallory.

The 15 KW and 21 KW heaters were never

satisfactorily completed.

Valad because of the difficulties

encountered over the 15 and 21 KW heaters refused to provide
the 36 KW and the 50 KW heaters.
It was conceded at the trial that the cost of

securi~

replacement heaters and the incidental costs to reconstruct the
test chamber to fit the new heaters, the cost of removal of the
defective heaters and the installation of the new heaters were
direct costs and under the Utah Uniform Commercial Code were
allowable i terns of damage to be awarded to Mallory against Va lad
and if

the·~ourt

against Brown.

refused to accept Brown's theory of the case,
The remainder of the so-called consequential

damages which Mallory claimed and which the court allowed are

not
permissible
damages
underprovided
anyby the
theory.
damages encamp:' ·
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all of the overhead items of

~allory

operation as taken from the

unaudited operating statement of Mallory which the court admitted
into evidence over the objection of both Valad and Brown.

(Ex. 99)

The basis upon which the counsel for Mallory claimed this could be
done was called the "contract completed method of accounting" which
may have validity before the IRS but hopefully will not be applied
to the determination of damages in a simple case of non-performance
of a sales contract.

The damages thus claimed comprise items of

which neither Valad or Brown could have had any awareness at the
time of making the contract with Mallory to supply heaters, and
which most assuredly could never have been within their contemplation at that time.
The Utah Uniform Commercial Code specifically sets forth
the damages for which a buyer may recover against a defaulting
seller at Sections 70A-2-711, 713 and 715, UCA 1953 as amended.
We set these sections forth in full in the appendiE to this
brief and submit that they are controlling.

No reasonable

construction of the language of thesasections could possibly
encompass the "consequential" damages claimed by Mallory.
CONCLUSION
The realities of the relationship between Mallory,
Brown and Valad are such that no justification exists, nor
support in the record, for the court's having awarded judgment
to Mallory against Brown for the loss it claimed to have suffered
by reason of Valad's failure to perform its contract.

Brown was

not at any time a guarantor of performance by the manufacturer
Valad.

The only primary failure of performance shown in the

exhaustive trial was the failure by Valad to manufacture heaters
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as required by the Order placed with it.

This :ailure resulted

in Brown's inability to deliver the ordered heaters, but Brown
had done nothing to contribute to or cause the failure.
The Judgment awarded to Mallory against Brown should
be reversed.

The judgment awarded to Brown against Valad for tt>e

loss suffered by Brown should be affirmed.
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70A-2-206. !'irm offen.-An offer by a merchant to buy or sell ~n··•h 11
a 1igned writing which by its terms gives assuranc~ that it will be• held ''\""·
is not revocable, for lack of couaidecatiou, during the time stated "r 1f ,,,,
time i1 1tated fc r a reasonable time, but in no event may such pc•ri"d .. ,
revocability e1c~ed three montl.s; but any such term of assL1r.1L1•··· "" .1 •,
supplied by the •lfferce must b~ <eparntely ~igneu by the otT•·r .. r
111-tol"J':

L. 1966,

§ 2-20~..

ch.. 15-l,

l<ult•-4 of rnn."lfru'
ai:r1•1 1111•11t, ';'Cl,\·: 111.:

CT01s.Beferencn.
Form .. ! r.·1p1ir1·11
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70.A..2-206. Offer &Dd accept&DCll in formation of contract -- I
otherwise unamoigunusl)' indir 1teu hy the languai;e or cir"llnl'!"I" "'
(a) an offer to make a contrad 'hA.11 be con'itru1·1l 11 .... lll\ .t 111_. .:·,
ance in any manner and by nny ruPdium rea.snnable i11 11, .. , 11. '·'
stance&;
(b) &D ord!r or other offer to buy goods for prompt or rurr• 11' -!.;
ment ll&ll be coustru< d as inviting acceptance eithrr h;- a 1••· 1·;
promia·! tu ship or by thl' prompt or current sbipmeut of, 01 ~-.r11.
ing or •lf•Lconforming gooJs, but such a shipment .,f D<•ll•'""f"rni
goods d<Hs uot constitute an aL·c~ptanct· if the scllC'r s ... a~r.•·,ii,,
notifie~ tile buyer that the sh1pruP11l is o!fc·re.J Cini/ as 1111 II•'<'• 1:.111
datiou to the buyer.
(2) Where the beginning of a re4ues•,..J J•"I f,.,·u ""'"' is a rc':I"''· .!
mode of acceptance an otlernr who is nnt 1w1it11·,l of :td••pla111•e "'1!~111
reuooable time may treat the ·)fff·r a ... ha' i11:: L1p"'t•.J hr-fi·rt• n.1•c·ppf:wr1·
Jllakl1"1: L. 1"6. eh.. lM, § 2-200.
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70.\-2.207. Additional ter:ns in acceptance or conf.-- -'•'ion.- 11 .I
definite and 1euonable expression <•f ai·reptance or a w c
rnnfir111:it1•· 1
which ia 1ent within a reasonable time operates as an nceep·
rvrn tbou1 1 1
it 1tates terms lMiditional to or dift.,rent from thn•e otTcr-'·I <r a:.:rrr.t 11\"'' I
unleas acct-pta.nce i& expressly made co11di1 io11al on 1t!'\:-r11t tn the add1!1"1 1 ~
or difYereut tenns.
(2) The additional terms are to br ronst rur<I as propo<als for ad.\ iii•'
to the contract. Between merchant' such terms brcome part of the r"11lr"'
W1le1>11:
(a) the offer expreuly lin1ita acceptance to the term~ of the offer;
.
(b) they D1ateri111ly alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them bas already been gi,·en or is gll<"
within a reasonable time after notif'e of them is recci'l"ed.
1

I
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3 Conduct by both parties whieh recognizes the exist'"'" u:· a c<·ll11,,uufficient to establish a contract for sale although the wr1tu1g> of the
irti!I do not otherwise establish a contract. In such case the term• of tht>
srticular contract consist of those terms on which the writiugs of the par81gree, together with any supplemeutarr t<'rtn< icieorpnratecl under 8'1!'
~!r provisions of this act.
liJt<>rJ: I.. 1986, ch. 1M, § 2-207.
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10.l-2-208. Coune of performance or practi·::al oomtructicn.- l 1
1rethe contract for sale involves repeated occasicns for perform u11 e '>1
ir party with knowledr:e of the nature of the P·~rform&nce and OJ•f'"r·
~ty for obj•ction to it b;- the other, any course of performance acccpte•I
101uiesce<l in without objection shall be rele\"&nt to determine th• mean.
so: the agreement.
'. r2. The express term• of the agreement anc any auch coursP. of
~ormance, as well as any course of dealing and "CS11ge of trade. ·•hall be
~trued whenenr reasonable as conaistent with each other; hut when
lh "onstruction i> unreasonable. express terms 5hnll control colll'!le of
lformance and course of performanre shall contrhl both conl'!le of deah11:
~UJage of trade (section 70A-l-20j \.
i31 Subject to the provisiona of the next aectir·n on modification and
inch courae of performance ahall be relevant to show a wn. iver or
cation of any term inconai~tent with such course of performan·,e.
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!OU.209. Jlodi.ftcation, resc:ilaiou ud W'&iver-(1) An agrtem•?nt
iafymg a contract within this chaptor needs no considoratioc to be
~mr

.'2) A •igned agreement which exclude• moditkation or resci.,;ion ~J:·
writing cann"t be otherwise mod: 6cd or rescinded, hut

~hr a aigned

39

-ii-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~ALE.'

&mpJ07ee 1t.ock parcba.s.e pl&J1.

10· • 1,.1..r.t

l'L111111n' 11p"11 l rf»1mir1i.: 1·r1 1·1••.' ,.,
i· r
··h:i .. r.t "'""" 1lf hn'rl ··oq .. •ri,11011 ••ii•• 1
10 11·1·urrhaar "~'"''11\•·nl 1t'. . 1Qr .. t• I 1••11·r 11
,·uqolP_,,,. lrfl rm1>h•~n11·11t
1r "·' .. ,J1 ...
,·haqrrd. upon tf11u·h1tri:•· 11: I<' '" ,.,.,,.k
J•llllllf'rt tn t'orpt•r:.111111. 11n I upou l"nrpor:i
1111n'• rrfuatt.l tu •&l"<"t'j•I :111 I J ;p· for .,,., k
\d1t•11 t.-ad•rr•I. •mplo'.\C"r roul.1
m11111lt11n
.Jrf1un for airrrr•I Jl"'"r Jl1p·1 ·• ' .,.1·11d11h
1101,.1, In'-· ~et' JlH, u P ::.1 fi~!'
0

Meaaun of 4amacu.
Tlif" mf'a11ur1• nf •l.1m:i;!•'... 11 :irt 1 "' i.,
.. ,.nrr to rrf'O\ rr I'' t r of Ii:"' ola .... 1.i. 1~ .1
mall• r o( ~f"111•r·d l1<w llnll:.rd 1·1,,,\,_ \tf;.:.
1·0. t". 1'nnlW'll1tht"'i1 Wl\J:'"" ..\' \t:i,.h11i1· f'n ..
H• l' •.1, lhl P. ~':!~.

Waiver and °'°PPtl
Jn ;11f1un 1., 1u·l1r .. f
, ) •I

1•

!•J

fl.,..,, .. r )•llft'l11111u

lt1t•\•·~•1·,..:

j1flf',.,

70A-2-71 l

\\

l.,

·111

,.,.,

!11 uu ...

h1·1,.·l1'
:in I 11

;Jfl.t

n( •:tit>
... 1•!111jl

d1.111f' pr1r1·.
l'1•n•n:1.J:1trd

·l

"1: • rn 11·h •,•' ,]

,,J

n• t

..,. I • ..
h ' l \ I'.:
h·1•· k '1!•"11 ;11 '
.r:i.11) <'h1111111Jl (•i I

1n <"on .. !
.q.,.j ,jrl \ ,... ~.

nf h.'IT\"('llltrr
p:i'.\ m('nl nf full J•llT·

UJ ,.,.

\\:tl\rd

uturn

o(

marhrnP

""oi;:nn A ~f:irhinl"' Cn.
1" J'.:. l! o f'. P37, fii•Lnr·1111lw I in 7.", 1· J~4. Zlil:'l P. ':'31.
! n tt ·111•11 liy •rll1·r o' l1art"r1! 1nl: m:u·bint"
to rPr 1\·t"r purrhaat" prirf', wh4"rr1n c1f'fpn1~
;u1• r1 ntrn1l,.rf Hal nuiint' rlid ""' fulfi~I
'"',, .. n( t1tarrnnty, li5'?'t\1ni of 11At111f:it'fion
l".1rJ h iirfrn1lont watbcut rrft•l1ng ita roi
!:•11t•. on r1•prr••nlatiot' or IM'l!er·• &l(rnt
Wr1a:li!,

",fi

tlutl ti 1111•y rn11tairot'1I 11l 1frftl('nf lhnt l~f'"f
, .. 1• 1·rr-.r11t. 1li1I not .. ,, ... ,, df'f4"r11lant frotn
d,.n,·111i;: -.1at('11wnt o! lllli11fa('twn 1n t:'nrd.
1 ·n,;,.,,.1•la 1r,f \\.:&ill"" .i \faf'hinr l'n.
Writ,'. 1.f ·,,; T" -,-.:!. J!itl P P:l7, d1•lln~11•h<"oi
in-~,.

r1'JT1

1"•'1>'' • ,:,

(".IT::
'' r Ill• '' ~
\\ .• rr-. I I::.
r.· 1 .,.,.' 1,, rrr1· , \ I ' ni"lrh 111"'

\..~L ~ .... IP.

7'31.

70.l-2-710. Seller's incident&! d&m&gea -Inridental dam•i;"s to an
a!!grieveJ seller .nolude r.ny commPreially reasonable char 1 ~e•. e'.'<penses or
111m?r1i~ ... i 11 !;~ i1."urrP~l in stPpping delin~ry, rn the- transpor:ation. <·Rre and
·us« .. ly ,,( gouJH after the buyer's br·,ach. in conn~ction with return or
re>ale "' tli" ['!'ood1 or otherwise resultin~ !rorn the breach.
JlL,tory. L. 1965, ell. 154, § 2-710.
Collateral BeftrtDCts.
~,1 •• e=.1:0. Je~. 3,1
".' ... l ... J.~. Salf'I § 477

( ).
el l'll'q.

70.l-2-711. Buyer'a remedies in gener&l-Buyer'1 MCUrity interest in
rejected goocb.- 1l) Where the .e!ler fails In make dP!inry or repudiate.
or !he hi1ye·· rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes e.ccept&nce then
,,-ith respect to any gvods iu.-eoh·ed, anrl with r••pect to the who!e if the
breach gnes to the whole contract (section iOA-2-612). the buyer may
··&nee! and whether 1•r not he bu done so may in a•l·iition :o reco,·ering so
much or the price u hes been paid
•n1 ··cover .. and haH dantal?PS ur.dn the next <e••tic·n u to all the
l?norls 1t'Te,·ted wJ. .. thrr or no: they ha,·e been i.lentificrl to the
1•,.ntract; or
Ii

r··f"'n\·rr la1:1:i~1·' f,,r nnuJclivr-y A~ prrn·i1l··d in t~ is rhartrr (~ec
t111n iOA-2-713).

12)
(al

Whne the <eller fails to deliver or repudiates the hu~·er msy also
i( the gc•<Hls hn,-e been identifierl reconr them as :>rcn·icled in this
chapi.•r ;•ection iOA-Z-502); or
in a proper csse obtain speci6" performance nr rPp]P\·y the goods
as provi1leJ in this chapter (section 70A-2-71G:.

(b1

(3) On ri!!'lil rul rejection or jnatifiable re\·ocation or acceptance a
buyer baa a security interest in goods in hi• possession or control for an~
paym~nt.I n.n·'•· "" their price and any expenset1 reasonably inrnrr•d in
their inspect.
rereipt, transportation, care a11d custody an.I m•y hol•I
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Pur.

rf,..,,

1,.• •. ;

••I {'

t •· r

,j

uf

au ""1·r1-... ~ or in11 Ji,.,i
,·1. •. 1,
h11\·"r 111.1 ,. l1ri11A: :.rt 1ur1 fur ,I •'II 1..:"" ~·1 r
tli~ tor! or "·ruui.:-. \\' t1;.:li1 \
If· "•'. 11;
t• ,"'1lit."I, !.ill P. 95•i, I.. If \. l. 11..J:. 1 \"I
Tluu1i.::1 u11 l1r1•:1··h ur' warr '".• •·' •I
;i Lii (\f,111; 1'11· t llf' l.IJ~'f"~ 111ii.:1 I 11.0 \ I
' ,j " t

.\n.Jl°r)IHIJ, :'j1)

....

'•lrtl

c'o•1-.

.·.1;:-.::1• I' 111:-:,.
Choice of remedie11.
J 11 .. 1 •· : .t u! ,.1ii ; .:

r.

;·r•·• 1··1•·•·• i,, r.
l>r1•:11·l1 in .1•·! I"'' 1•.,. "' I' ~
;•r(o I', ~f 1'·1:1 j f II,, .. \0

r:111t11·" 11rt• ro11d111<>1'1•

\·LI'"' :0-!11\ l" I "
Lu11d1l'r 1 ·,,
".<
.: I ·, I '. ' 141 ••• • ..:~ 1 •\ , I . H: . 1; :, ~ • : I •, ·' r" 1 • \ • :1 I' " "
:--1"'' 1·., , . F:1r·t1•'t:"1. 1· .... 11 1'111<•11 hi I

,

I

I'. l'"

Defense of breach of '"·ura.."lty
It 1• rlf'mP11l:ir~ th:ll iot1p11: ·'"

,.,,.1,."
ir•I• r

d •

•':11111 •I

:o:

1"'.

I I,

J.r.1•.:.11..'

11n:1 fur l1rl":11·h nf "·1rr •111.\

1'Lir"h·1

Y. ~lt·1 "t •.

In·

Ii.it\',.,,.,

w;i .. 1'011111111 ... 1 fur n1nt1· ''· '" '
111·r1111l of ti11• 0!:1.' "· it "·:1• 11 ...
owll rtr'nrt• :in•l hY itit • 01. .. ·
1 'on·'«•liolatf'•l
Wn.:t•n .I: ~f:trhiru•
Wt1,,:li1. ;,fl r. 3":.!. l!1t1 I'.!'~:'.

I.. ·

1111:

... 1·llo-r'a

T 111·

il\111• r.!
.!11 • • r.

Llen or buyer.

Pntr ...

u •._,···r h:1• 11•1 li1·n on enfl1i~ fur :111• .. 111·
c•f 1··ird1ftR rri1·r rai•I tl1l'rr1•n 'lflk·· ,i,, ..
ha .. ··-·t•n a lort•;11·l1 of w;trr:lnt~ 11'\'·"'''''

1•n1h; If'
\ rr r ,),I

1.. 11! p ..i1l t•ut 1011 1· •nt r-.. t,

9::!

-ivSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IOA-:!-il:!
}:r,,,. . . t

r.

Farller

ro ,

ll<'tl!u·r

161. F. ·:d

~lf\.4. r1T111~ r:t"<'"

f·om othf'r juri.!dit"1nn" ;1~
wrJ: 0
\\1lll•roa, ~a..ltc>I', \'ol. ~. _,t r:, .,
§ 4'•:. I'· 1~%.
\\"hf'rt> b11yl"'r, 11pon in111rf'rtinn n~ Yr;:,.
tJ.hJt>, _,, Salr I .11k1· City 1h11'r" i fM111
l.11111l'11~ 11.1.
r1•1f'l'f1··~

promptly notitif'J

111Pllf'r

'''liZf'l.ablPt hf'r&Ulllf' of

1 l1nt

i,,.

th,,.1r

unrequP~ff'd 111·

\\:llll

.dfirmp,j or :ipJ>r·il

('n. \'. ll("'ll'lf'r, }tiC F

:,:.!

~.r111 _,
~iq

!

Waiver.
A huyf'r <lid nnt "';ii,(' hi' r1i:l 1
l('lnrl the pure hue
au 1'111,rn .. 1.
hr1•ad1 u( 11arr:int~ that if w1111:d r , 1,
rrJ•POff"',lly taluni;: it h:irk for a,! ,u•:· 1

or

mc-rrl.-rnht.lr ton,Jition an<t
fro1n seller "' to tht>ir •lispo:-oition, :in•l •t>ll('r instn1rterl bu,·pr to d- .....
posr of \t"flt>lalolf't Rf !Jp9f pril"(; ohf~inal IP

:ind rt-p.11n1, whPtE> n1•th1n,;: m•"•' 11"
tC'n•!··•I tlian to fA'r"t •! ,. ~··~· .. r anq1:1· "t'

:uut, ilfft"r rt":wit• ir. &('('orda.nr(' th• re-wit!.,

1tor •.

1trudh1n!t

R('tt>plf'd nrt prorreJ.!I thrrf'from •itltout
qualifirntion, lllE'Jlf"t U•PQINl fo rrorm1rd
rPs("i•111on 111nrl di!lrh:tr2'r nt nr15,!in:tl uJ •.,
~o

tlint JU•iJ:n1··111 ~rtf1ni: a111.Jl' repnnt1:•11
order in pro('~1·.J1 1.: 1111.i. r r ... 1.·r.11 f)rti"t :1
t,le ,\jtt1('ul1ural \'un1mod1 1 1c~ .\('t nf ]!1.;.1

tu11i1y to put tl•r r--11

woulol run. :O:.t111I••• , ;. · ·

:.o

Hu~

l' 3 lll,
t·t m:-iy

lfi~

1·1Lon ••
1 ',,
·' •

''" h r1;:ht . .\1h ..rio"

Inc·

,.

Stidd.;.~,

;:11, .. h,.,J 111 !>:! I

\·.

I

w;11\·

I' )_';
111
I·

•

r1.
l

70.&-2-712. "Cover''-Buyer's procurement of substitute good!
After a breaci '~ithin the prece,Jino; section tho bunr moy """'"'
making in good faith anJ without unreasonable ,Jela)· any '""" 1',
purchase of or contract to purchase goods in snbstitutinn for those diie fr
the aeller.
(2) The buyer may reco,.er from the seller as dAma~es the rli!Ter"
between the c•ist of coYer and the contract pricP toi::cth••r w1lli al/'.
dentAI or con1·~quential JamAges as hcrl'inarter d•fined r ,ect ion iu.I ~.;r
but less expen~es sa\'ed in co11Sequence of the aP.ller's brrac h.
(3) Failure of the buyer to el!ect coYor witlin this s,l't ion d'"'' ",''
him from any other remedy.
8Utol'}':

L. JHl5, clL 154, § 2-712.

'1i.i1~.1t1•·••

,,' c• ,, 1 • 1' 1 -,. \
7 \ J _:" !
I lo-~. 7• \ : -

H•"1""r1:il.J1• f l!'P

Crou-Bef1rucn.

I\,

Ruy cf,. lla111A1~··-. (,.r 11n11·l••l1\ 1·1 ~ tor
putliation. 7'flA ~ 7i3
lluvt"t'" intoidf'r1t11l ::rn.J rMt,.•"111•·11 .d
damo·~,.~. -:'tJ.\-:.!···1 i.
Ru~·<'r',. ri~ht to -.tpt•.-1ti•· prrf11rman•·"
rtplev1n, 70A·:.?-:Jfi.

-1:1

I•· I·,.

~·

C<>llateraJ Referencei:::.
. . .r .... c::::q111i,:-, l '..J .!"

:O:.alt>~

§ ·,.;"

70.t.-2-713. Buyer'• damages for nondelivery or repudiation
Subject to th·~ provisions of this ~haptrr with respect :n nro .. f .. r 1·
price (section 70A-2-723), the rr.easurr of damages for nn11.J,.J ., ,
repudiation b1 the seller is the di:Teren"'' hctwem the market pr.,,· ·"
time when thi! buyer learned of the brrn..J1 and the contract pri<'e I•~
with any incidental and cor.seq~ent ial clamages prm·ided in this ,.1,,,
(aeetion 70.A-2-715), but lrsa exp~nse> sa,·ed iu consequence of 1b,• ;r:
breach.
(2) Harhet price i.a to he determined as of the place for tender"'
cuea of rejection after arrhal or revocation of acceptance, as of the r'
of arri"al.
Hu_vf"'r"9 ri1ht to 14pr('ifir pnform.1"
auto..,: L. 11116, c11. 154, I :i.113.
tPJ•lro:1n, '."OA·~·716.
l'rnu( ot m~rkt'f prir•·

Crou-lLeference".

71 1 . \ .:: 7:.:J

Hu,·rr"11r prn1·urr11u·ut .,( !lul.,..1 it 11(' ;.::11"1'.
711.\ ..: ; I:.
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t1mf' :i11il I

70A-2-il5

l':'>IFt>R~I

'.<Ht~ffRCIAL

CODE

(2) The mfasure of ,J.:.11a:· .. s f •r brearh of warranty ia the different<'
at the lime anc place of A<Tel'l8D<'e bet\\eeu the Value Of the goods 81'Cepted &lid the value thry woulJ have baJ if they had been as warranted,
UD!eu special cirenmstanees show proximate damages of a different am.,unt.
(3) In a proper caae any incidental and con.qeqnentid rlamag,·s tmder
the next section may also be reconr~J.
L. 18'16, clL 1114, § 2-7H.

Jlinory:

"l'l'<'l..J JamU!rt'f for hff':lt•h 0(

Crou-&ereunces.
HurJt•u of P~t:d•li!\l1i111o!' ),rf'ad1 aft~·r
•·t>11rau1·1". :n.\.:! tiU7.
lluyt·r·~ Janu1.I("" for no111lrli' ery or r••·
vuJi.1ti1•11. 711A-:..'·:Ll.

Buyer":oi i:tr1.Jr ital
.Iamai.:e-... 711.\-:.! 71j_

:an.I

~·1111~<"•1'tC'nti.d

Hu_n·r· ... r• ui. .!11"' iu ~1·111·r.d
vf 11;11111.:•·" fr1111:

70 ~~~·~1-~,1 ~1."11

litto.J,. or 1·0111li 1•t

1•11\ t•r J:tm3Jf'I for

•ellPr's hrt"arh Pl \'

raut~·. 53 A. L. R. :?d :!:o.
~1,•a1n1rp in rl.-ment~ of

rrf'o\·f'rv of 1.•

1•r r1·"'ri11,Jin;.: aalt." of dum1·111l1r nOi111 ,. :.
1t1·JJ .. r'11 Lrt•a.-11 of wartanf\·, :1::0 .\. I.. I:

7P.\ ~ 7"11

1:::J.

~t':ISUre u( Jn.m:1J:l'!l in adinn for l•r• "
,,( warranty ot till~ to penon:1l pr••:····
a!'I tl1r cllu1· o( tl.e l roprrty •ir 11.o· 1-r,
11111• 1nt1•r"-"'· IJ A. J•. R. :!d 13~:.!.
P11rd1us1·r",. Ult" or att .. mplr1I ume ur :1,.1
1·1'°" known to hr d1·fP('fi\·r :.i1 afl'.-,·1111.:
1la111:1~1· .. rr• O\'f'raLlt> for hrt"111·h of w:. ·

"1·1111furm111.:··

1•rin•.
lo ',,,..

Collateral Jle!erenc11.
~:ll1• .. C==4

I ,II•'

lln

tr:id, :-o.\-:!·I111i (:!
lfl'\u1·:1t1011 of :.nt"pt.ui .. t.• in "l.eo •' nr 111
l'a.rt, ;'UA-:: 1;0K.

•

'.\

1;;; .\.I •. R. lu7;,
Form and aub11ta11cr of noti· ,. \\ 1-1.
h11yrr of good• n1u11t jl'l\C in or•l•·r 1,, ,,

.

r.inty. :s:i A.. L.B. 2d !11.
of Je:d•r &J::ain•t 111• vrn•lnrLrt1o·u•h o( •·a..rra.uf\· ;u tu :1r11.

I "J. 4:?";".

H1i:ht
t'B!le ot

';M t',J,:-i. Sal1•'4 ~§~:!LI, .Ho E"t 9P'1.

Barr1·oi d:1im of hrtarh o( warr1ntv u
111uhjf>cf of !'lt'totr, ~uuntt•r1•lni111, or f.roia.'I
art ion. I A.. L. R. ;,!J 11: l. ti!'-4.
Drt•a1·h of warr.111f_; ;1 .. to titk a~ witl1i11
1•ro\ L' nu ri··1;1,ri11a: no111·r c.f
\'.,1rr.11'I.\ "11 •.11" uf gund:ot, 11-4
.\. 1.. IL ;11'.'".
Bu,·.·r'..i ri•furn o( .. 111. j .. d ••( !' df' anJ
a1·n•1;t:llH't' u( t1··11r11 uf or 1•n•1lit for tit•
J•Ur1·J.;, .. ,. 1·rin• al'I af1',•,·1i11i.:: ri~hl lu r1•1u\1•r

ll .I. L. R.

!'tatutor~

lirt':td1 ut"

t'•

1.:

~~ .\. l.. R. IJJ and d~ .\.
R. ~·.;
Time within whi,·h hu~·er of goo•l1111 11111~·
fi\"t- nutit't' in orJ,·r 111 rrC"Q\f'r d::m.1..:•
fur :.••llt'r's hrra,·h ,.r t>IJ•ft."M \\;1rt,11.1_,

1· ... t'
ri~!.I

.:

~1~.

O( :1ftidP ,,~ J,U.\l'r ~" \\".1i\Pr '
tu r1••1•11i.\ t'ur I r.1·:·1. 1111•.11 !, "' \\ .. ·

~~::; ~ 't;~ ;~11 '.~L-~'i . '·~! ~·;·;:! ~.. '~'I ,-~~·1, (

I:

11; ...

70.A-2-715. Buyer'1 incidental a,nd consequential damages.-(11 111·:
dental damages result111~ from ti"' sdlcr's lircach induole 1•xpr11'"' r""'"'·
ably incurreJ in inspection, rec•·ipt, tran•portation atul care a111l <'lt-l<ni·.
of goods right:'ully rejccteJ, any comm~r,ially rrasonabk d1arg•·•. HP""'' or commiuioo:1 in connection with effcctiug conr anJ any other r,·as .. 11al•I ·
expense iucideot to the delay or other breat·h.
(2) Couscquential Jamavcs resulting from the seller's bn·ach i11clu1h·
(a) &Dy Joaa resulting from general or particular requirements a11,l
need• of which the seller at the time of contracting haJ rrason I•
know and which could not rtasonably be pre-·enteJ by cover ..r
otherwise; and
(b) injury to person or property proximately r~aulticg Crom any
breach of warranty.
Enu11e hr tailurt• of prt••ur1•1i..1· !
lllstory: L. 11186, clL 15', t ~·r16.
0

Jitinn1, 10A·:!-6lj.

ero...... r1renc11..
Cool rndual mo1lifi1·;d 1011 ut li1111
r~u1nJy, :"IJ.\ .:_: ;

:ii~.,,

,.

n(

\!I.

Oblia-:atJUu
Ht•u11•1Hr~

ot

l'on1J faith, :oA.-J.::···:.

lihrr1.1lly :i1lmini,.ff'rt··I. '.'"

,;.
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